Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said Thursday he would remain in office until his term ends in September while ceding authority to Vice President Omar Suleiman. His address to the nation, and a following speech by Suleiman, served only to further inflame the hundreds of thousands of protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square who had expected to hear that he was stepping down altogether. Experts were divided on whether Egypt’s army, its most powerful and respected institution, would side with demonstrators and force Mubarak out.
Whether this would result in democratic rule, however, remains a very open question. If Suleiman takes full power, he is expected to be a ruthless authoritarian akin to Mubarak, and there is little reason to expect an honest election later this year. But if the army takes over and announces it will oversee a transition to democracy, there is vast uncertainty as well.
One survey by Pechter Middle East Polls shows the most powerful factor driving recent demonstrations is anger over the economy and high unemployment, especially among well-educated young people. The same poll says the Muslim Brotherhood – the powerful religious group feared by the U.S., Israel and Mubarak alike – is only viewed positively by 15 percent of the those surveyed. This offers hope for creation of a secular, Turkey-like democracy.
However, other polls are alarming. A Gallup survey showed Egyptians support democracy, but most define the term as theocracy, with two-thirds saying Islamic law alone should govern the country. This suggests creation of a nominal democracy dominated by Muslim authoritarians – a prospect that bodes ill for Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority and could prompt the army to suspend a transition to democracy.
The implications of this tumult for the U.S. – and Israel, which has peacefully cooperated with its western neighbor for three decades – are unsettling. If the army maintains power with U.S. support – and the continuation of $2 billion in annual U.S. aid – only an economic turnaround is likely to stem further public unrest. But changing who governs Egypt won’t in the short term change endemic problems – corrupt public institutions, relatively few natural resources, poorly developed export industries – that keep the economy weak. A revolt remains possible, one that could bring to power an Iran-style regime that abrogates the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and turns the Sinai Peninsula into a battleground again.
Obviously, the stakes are high, and not just for Egyptians yearning for change.
Meanwhile, the Arab world’s perception of U.S. hypocrisy is likely to grow. America’s preference for stable regimes, dictatorial or otherwise, may be defensible, but it is hard to reconcile with our noble rhetorical championing of democracy. So much for a “hearts and minds” strategy to improve the U.S. image in the Middle East and in other Islamic nations so as to lessen the support for jihad against the West.
Whether this would result in democratic rule, however, remains a very open question. If Suleiman takes full power, he is expected to be a ruthless authoritarian akin to Mubarak, and there is little reason to expect an honest election later this year. But if the army takes over and announces it will oversee a transition to democracy, there is vast uncertainty as well.
One survey by Pechter Middle East Polls shows the most powerful factor driving recent demonstrations is anger over the economy and high unemployment, especially among well-educated young people. The same poll says the Muslim Brotherhood – the powerful religious group feared by the U.S., Israel and Mubarak alike – is only viewed positively by 15 percent of the those surveyed. This offers hope for creation of a secular, Turkey-like democracy.
However, other polls are alarming. A Gallup survey showed Egyptians support democracy, but most define the term as theocracy, with two-thirds saying Islamic law alone should govern the country. This suggests creation of a nominal democracy dominated by Muslim authoritarians – a prospect that bodes ill for Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority and could prompt the army to suspend a transition to democracy.
The implications of this tumult for the U.S. – and Israel, which has peacefully cooperated with its western neighbor for three decades – are unsettling. If the army maintains power with U.S. support – and the continuation of $2 billion in annual U.S. aid – only an economic turnaround is likely to stem further public unrest. But changing who governs Egypt won’t in the short term change endemic problems – corrupt public institutions, relatively few natural resources, poorly developed export industries – that keep the economy weak. A revolt remains possible, one that could bring to power an Iran-style regime that abrogates the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and turns the Sinai Peninsula into a battleground again.
Obviously, the stakes are high, and not just for Egyptians yearning for change.
Meanwhile, the Arab world’s perception of U.S. hypocrisy is likely to grow. America’s preference for stable regimes, dictatorial or otherwise, may be defensible, but it is hard to reconcile with our noble rhetorical championing of democracy. So much for a “hearts and minds” strategy to improve the U.S. image in the Middle East and in other Islamic nations so as to lessen the support for jihad against the West.
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